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I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
s
 Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Should the trial court have modified the permanent award of alimony set forth 
in the original divorce decree. 
1. Standard of Review 
Question of fact that the court reviews for abuse of discretion. Willey v. Willey, 951 
P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997), Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 (Utah 1990) 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this case. 
IV. STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) which provides as follows: 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding 
alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time 
of the divorce. 
V. RULES PROVISION 
There are no court rules at issue in this case. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
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This is an appeal from a bench trial held March 2, 2004 in regards to a petition to 
modify a divorce decree submitted by the Respondent for the purposes of terminating the 
amount of alimony paid to the Petitioner. The case was heard before Judge L. A. Dever in 
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
B. COURSE OF PR OCEEDINGS 
The original Decree of Divorce as entered June 8, 1998. The Petition to Modify was 
filed March 2, 2003. The order which terminated the alimony was entered April 30, 2004. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The trial court granted Respondent's request to modify the original divorce decree 
arid completely eliminated the $700 alimony payment to the Respondent as of March 2, 
2004. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Christine C. Smith (Petitioner) and Alan B. Smith (Respondent) were divorced on 
June 8, 1998, after 29 years of marriage (R83-88). Judge Wilkinson presided over the 
original divorce. Towards the end of their marriage, the Respondent required a 
substantial amount of medical care in regards to his mental health issues. Respondent 
prohibited the Petitioner from using joint income to pay for the medical bills. (R212, p.20) 
Petitioner spent $70,000, almost all of her inheritance, to pay the bills associated with the 
medical care received by the Respondent (R212, p.21). The original divorce decree 
called for a division of wealth based on the length of the marriage and the economic 
circumstances between the parties. (R781f 2, R84 ^[3, R212, p.22). The economic 
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circumstances were the length of marriage (29 years), the Petitioner had quit college and 
worked to support the Respondent as he went through college, she then became a stay at 
home mom raising three children rather than pursuing her career, she's used her 
inheritance to pay for the medical needs of the Respondent such that her inheritance was 
basically lost, the Petitioner was just starting a career and the Petitioner's earning 
capacity. The Petitioner had just begun working as a nurse (R212, p. 16) and was making 
$2,154 per month (R212, p.6; R77 J^5). It was anticipated that as she progressed in her 
career that her income would increase. She discussed her anticipated increase in income 
with Judge Wilkinson prior to his issuing the divorce decree (R212,p. 17 & 25). 
Judge Wilkinson ordered the Respondent to permanently pay $700 a month (R35 
PI5). The divorce decree left the Petitioner without any 401(k) funds (R212, p.20; R84 
f4). The Petitioner had taken a non liquid asset, the home, in exchange for the 401(k) in 
order to provide a home for her and the children. (Note: the children were over the age of 
18.) The Respondent was living with his mother when the Decree of Divorce was entered 
and also at the time of trial on the petition. The fact that the Petitioner spent almost all of 
her inheritance in taking care of the Respondent for his medical needs, which Judge 
Wilkinson considered separate property, when there were marital assets which would 
have been used, which the Respondent refused to allow to be used, and that the Petitioner, 
in receiving the home would not have available to her liquid assets as would the 
Respondent, Judge Wilkinson made the award of alimony permanent. (R84 f2; R212,p. 
20-24). Because the Petitioner was just starting her career and it was known 
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and anticipated that her income would increase and to make up for what she had lost, 
Judge Wilkinson ordered that the only change which could occur in modifying the 
alimony award would be a modification in the Respondent's income/benefits. Judge 
Wilkinson ordered as follows: 
"If unforeseen circumstances occur as to the amount of income 
received by the respondent, because of changes in his disability and/or 
changes in his disability income that the same shall be a basis for modification 
and/or review of the alimony as the court deems appropriate at the time and 
under the circumstances that exist at the time of occurrence of the substantial 
change of circumstances. (R84 [^3; R211, p. 5) 
The original divorce decree contained references to the Petitioner's school loans 
for her recently completed nursing school (R84, f^ 4; R211, p. 4). 
Petitioner is 54 years old (R212, p.28). She has just recently been able to begin to 
save money in a 401(k) in anticipation of her retirement (R212, p.20). At the time of the 
divorce the Petitioner was making $2154 a month, before taxes. (R84 f^ 2). She is now 
making $4,333 a month, before taxes. Even though Petitioner's income has increased, the 
Respondent's net income is still greater than the Petitioner's net income by $300 per 
month. (R212, p. 54 and Exhibit F) 
None of the above facts were disputed or contested by the Respondent. 
Respondent asked the court to modify the divorce decree citing a substantial material 
change in circumstances that was unforeseen at the time of the divorce, which he solely 
identified as the increase in income to the Petitioner. 
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It was this increase in income which Judge Dever used to terminate the alimony. 
Judge Dever determined that the Petitioner had a 92% increase in income while the 
Respondent had only a 5% increase in income and that increase was sufficient to establish 
a substantial material change in circumstances. (R198) In modifying the permanent 
award, Judge Dever used the language in Bollinger v. Bollinger, 997 P.2d 903 (Ut. App. 
2000) to define when a change in circumstances was foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. Judge Dever's restrictive definition in Bollinger requires that a circumstance be 
expressly stated in the record or in the divorce decree itself for it to be considered 
foreseeable. Though markedly different than the language of the statute, the definition 
was adopted by the court to prevent the court from having to be forced to try to resolve 
disputes about what was said or contemplated prior to the issuing of a divorce decree. 
However, in applying this restrictive definition, Judge Dever limited his inquiry to the 
divorce decree and part of the transcript of the stipulation of the parties at the time of the 
decree. In this case, however, there wasn't a dispute as to what was meant by the 
language of ffi[2 and 3 of the Decree of Divorce (R84). Judge Dever did not take into 
account the undisputed evidence presented at trial by both parties nor the part of the 
transcript of the stipulation of the parties which limited changes in the alimony only upon 
changes to Respondent's income/benefits (R211, p.5). As a result, Judge Dever found 
that there was a substantial material change in circumstances that was unforeseen at the 
time of the divorce. Judge Dever then revoked the permanent award of alimony that was 
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set forth in the original decree, thereby relieving Respondent of all future payments. 
(R197-199). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to modify a trial court's modification of 
alimony when a trial court abuses its discretion. The trial court judge abused his 
discretion in two ways in this case. First, by finding that the Petitioner's increase in 
income was an unforeseen change circumstance, despite the undisputed evidence that the 
Petitioner's future increase in income was discussed with the trial judge and the 
Respondent. Second, the order terminating the alimony created a serious inequity by 
eliminating an award of alimony that was made permanent in the original decree because 
the Petitioner spent her inheritance, $70,000, to pay the Respondent's medical bills, 
Respondent's net income is still greater than that of the Petitioner, and the economic 
circumstance which were the basis for the permanent award still exist. In the alternative, 
this court should adopt an exception to the stringent requirement of Bollinger and allow 
the court to consider a change in circumstance to be foreseen when the evidence is 
undisputed that such a change was contemplated at the time of the original divorce 
decree. This exception should also be made because the instant action was decided prior 
to the court ruling in Bollinger. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY MODIFYING A PERMANENT AWARD OF ALIMONY THAT 
6 
WAS BASED ON EQUITY AND FOR REASONS THAT WERE FORESEEABLE AT 
THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ADOPT A LESS 
RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION OF WHAT IT MEANS FOR A CIRCUMSTANCE TO 
BE CONSIDERED FORESEEABLE. 
POINT I 
The Appellate Court Can Reverse The Trial Court's Alimony 
Award When The Trial Court Abuses It Discretion. 
A trial court maintains continuing jurisdiction over alimony awards and can make 
future modifications as appropriate. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1989), Johnson v. 
Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Ut. Ct. App 1993). If a trial court abuses its discretion when it 
modifies a divorce decree, the appellate court can reverse the trial court's actions. Willey 
v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Ut. 1997). The Appellate Court will not disturb the trial 
court's alimony award so long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the 
standards set by the appellate courts." Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Ut. 
Ct.App.1990). 
POINT II 
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing to 
Acknowledge that the Petitioner's Increased Earning Potential 
Was Foreseeable at the Time of the Divorce and that the 
Principles of Equity Require that the Original Award of 
Alimony be Permanent 
Utah law gives courts continuing jurisdiction over a divorce and allows courts to 
"make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i). After wrongly determining that the Petitioner's increase in income 
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was unforeseeable and ignoring the fact that the alimony was designated permanent in 
equitable considerations including the fact that the Petitioner spent her inheritance to pay 
the Respondent's medical bills, the trial court reduced the amount of alimony. 
a. The undisputed testimony makes it clear that Petitioner's increase in 
income was foreseen at the time of the divorce. 
In Bollinger, the court said that "it is axiomatic that parties to a divorce decree will 
experience some type of economic change after the original divorce decree is entered, the 
change, if substantial, will support a modification to the decree only if it was not foreseen 
at the time of the divorce decree." Bollinger v. Bollinger 997 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah App. 
2000) Similarly, the court in Dana said, "a change in circumstances reasonably 
contemplated at the time of divorce is not legally cognizable as a substantial change in 
circumstances in modification proceedings." Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726, 729 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
In the instant case, it was well known by both parties at the time of the divorce that 
the Petitioner had just finished nursing school and was starting her career as a nurse. The 
Petitioner's education and her starting a new career as a nurse were discussed with Judge 
Wilkinson in arriving at the parties's stipulation. The divorce decree contained specific 
references to loans that the Petitioner took out to finance her recently completed 
education to prepare her for her nursing career. At the time of the divorce, the 
Petitioner's job as a nurse provided most of her a monthly income of $2,154. It was 
foreseeable and contemplated by the Respondent and the court when the parties entered 
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into their stipulation that the Petitioner would experience an increase in her income as she 
continued to work as a nurse. 
The Petitioner's education and hard work at a job that she had just begun at the 
time of her divorce has resulted in an increase of income during the past 6 years. This 
natural progression was not only foreseeable at the time of the divorce, it was discussed 
by the parties and the judge; therefore it should not be considered grounds for modifying 
a permanent alimony award. The "foreseeable" increase was why Judge Wilkinson ruled 
that the only basis to modify the alimony award would be changes in the Respondent's 
income/benefits. (R84 ^3). This paragraph fl[3) of the Divorce Decree was completely 
ignored by the Judge Dever in making his ruling. 
b. The trial court should not have modified the award of alimony because 
it was based on principles of equity and was designed to be permanent. 
The Court of Appeals can reverse a trial court's decision concerning alimony when 
the trial court's decision upon showing that such serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest clear abuse of discretion. Rudman v. Rudman, 1991, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App.Ct. 
1991). The trial court in this case failed to consider the past economic circumstances of 
the parties and created a serious inequity when it modified a permanent award of alimony. 
Such inequity is grounds for reversal. 
The original divorce decree clearly stated that it was based on "the economic 
circumstances between the parties." The unrebutted testimony made it clear that among 
the economic circumstances considered were that Petitioner had quit college and worked 
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to support Respondent as he went through school getting his college degrees, she had 
been a stay at home mom, she was just starting a new career, the length of the parties' 
marriage, that her income was low but was anticipated to increase, Petitioner was 
receiving a non liquid asset (the home) while Respondent received a liquid asset (the 
401k), and the fact that the Petitioner spent her inheritance, $70,000, to pay the 
Respondent's medical bills because the Respondent refused to allow marital assets to be 
spent on his care. The Petitioner's inheritance was considered by Judge Wilkinson to be 
separate property under Utah law and, if it had not been used to pay the Respondent's 
medical bills, would have been hers to retain at the time of the divorce. See Burke v. 
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134 (Ut. 1987) (Stating that premarital property, gifts, and 
inheritances may be viewed as separate property, and in appropriate circumstances, equity 
will require that each party retain the separate property brought to the marriage). As a 
result of the expenditure of separate property for the benefit of the Respondent, and the 
Respondent receiving all of the 401(k), the original trial court ordered permanent alimony 
to be paid to the Petitioner. Any reduction of an award that was intended to be 
permanent and that was based on one spouse's substantial expenditure for the sole benefit 
of the other spouse is exceedingly inequitable. 
The original divorce decree provides additional evidence that the amount of 
alimony was intended to be permanent and not dependent on the amount of the 
Petitioner's income. The original divorce decree contained a provision for adjusting the 
alimony should the benefits/income received by the Respondent change. 
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"If unforeseen circumstances occur as to the amount of income received by the 
respondent, because of changes in his disability and/or changes in his 
disability income that the same shall be a basis for modification and/or review 
of the alimony as the court deems appropriate at the time and under the 
circumstances that exist at the time of occurrence of the substantial change of 
circumstances." (R84 ^ [3) 
Because the amount of alimony to be paid was not dependent on the Petitioner's 
income, no such provision was made in the divorce decree for changes to the amount of 
the alimony should the Petitioner's income increase or decrease. Even with the 
Petitioner's increase in income, the Respondent is still receiving more net income than the 
Petitioner by $300.00 per month. 
The trial court's abuse of discretion created a serious inequity by modifying the 
permanent award of alimony. This court should reverse the decision and restore the 
Petitioner's award of alimony. 
POINT III 
Because the Testimony About What Was Contemplated at the 
Time of the Divorce is Undisputed the Court Should Follow the 
Plain Language of the Statute and Not Use Such a Restrictive 
Definition for What is Considered Foreseeable. 
The Respondent points to Bollinger to assert that a change in circumstances is not 
foreseen unless it is stated in the record or in the divorce decree itself. The genesis of this 
interpretation in Bollinger comes from Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250. The court in 
Johnson was concerned about the difficulty of resolving old arguments about what was or 
was not contemplated or foreseen in a divorce decree at the time of the divorce. Stating 
"we do not believe it makes for good law or sound policy to have parties arguing years 
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years after the fact over what a trial court may or may not have considered when making 
an alimony award." Id at 253 
However, this case is different than Johnson and Bollinger. The parties are not 
arguing over what was considered at the time of the divorce. The evidence in this case is 
undisputed about what was discussed and foreseen prior to the construction of the original 
divorce decree. In cases like this, where the evidence about what was foreseen and 
contemplated at the time of the divorce is undisputed, there is no need for the court to 
adopt such a rigid and singular test for proving what was contemplated in the original 
decree. By creating an exception for cases where the evidence is undisputed, the court 
could create more just outcomes while still avoiding the entanglements of disputes over 
what was and was not foreseen at the time of the original decree. 
Because there is undisputed evidence that the Petitioner's future increase in 
income was foreseen and discussed prior to the court issuing the original divorce decree, 
this court should use a more literal definition of foreseeable and not require that the 
circumstance actually be discussed in the divorce decree to be considered foreseeable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellate Court can reverse a trial court's decision when it does not exercise 
its discretion within the established standards. The trial court violated one standard by 
modifying a decree based on circumstances that were foreseeable. The trial court also 
violated a standard by creating a result that led to a serious inequity. Accordingly, this 
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court should reverse the trial court's decision and restore the Petitioner's award of 
alimony. #* x 
DATED this2j2_ day of November , 2004. 
Attorney for PeTrtroher and Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTINE CORLEISSEN SMITH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ALAN BRUCE SMITH, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 974900256DA 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for pretrial on the 30th day of October, 1997 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, judge of the above entitled court. The petitioner was 
present and represented by her attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The respondent was present 
and represented by his attorney of record, Jane Allen. The court having previously entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and now, based upon such and for good cause appearing 
herein 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the respondent which Decree shall 
become final upon entry. 
2. Based upon the length of the marriage, the economic circumstances between the parties 
including the respondent's disability it is appropriate that there be an equalization of income. The 
respondent is to pay to the petitioner the sum of $698.00 per month as alimony based upon her total 
monthly income of $2,154 and the respondents total monthly income of $3,546.00 per month. The 
alimony as to be paid herein is a permanent alimony. 
3. If unforseen circumstances occur as to the amount of income received by the respondent, 
because of changes in his disability and/or changes in his disability income that the same shall be a 
basis for modification and/or review of the alimony as the court deems appropriate at the time and 
under the circumstances that exist at the time of occurrence of the substantial change of 
circumstances. 
4. The Northwest Pipeline 401k has a value of approximately $190,000. The parties are to 
withdraw from that account sufficient funds to pay in their entirety the debts and obligations owing 
on the second mortgage of approximately $8,499, the Westminster-Perkins Loan of $228.00, the 
Stafford Loan of approximately $20,000, the SLS Loan of approximately $2,112.00, the University 
of Utah Credit Union Loan of $4,758 and the MasterCard of approximately $7,350.00 together with 
sufficient funds to pay the taxes from the money withdrawn from said account. The parties will 
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thereafter file a joint tax return for the year 1997 with the parties being jointly responsible for the 
taxes upon said tax return. 
The remaining 401k having a value of approximately $125,000 is such that the remaining 
amount would be solely owned and held by the respondent on him transferring and giving over to the 
petitioner all equity in the parties' home together with $5,000. The respondent would be solely 
responsible for all tax liabilities associated with the remaining balance on the 401k with Northwest 
Pipeline. As a result of the transfers contained in the Decree it would equalize the accounts between 
the parties. 
5. The petitioner is awarded as her sole and separate property the Prudential and AT&T 
accounts together with all of her inheritances, her IRA's and her 401k free and clear of any claim by 
the respondent. 
The respondent is to be awarded the IRA of the petitioner's which is in the sum of $3,800 free 
and clear of any claim by the petitioner. 
6. The petitioner is awarded one-half (Vi) of all retirements, pension plans, annuities which 
have been acquired by the respondent and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue for the 
distribution of the same. 
7. The parties have two accounts which have been maintained for the parties' child, Beth's, 
education. Those accounts are at the University of Utah Credit Union in the sum of approximately 
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$4,000 and a Certificate of Deposit at the University of Utah Credit Union in the sum of 
approximately $5,200. Those items will remain for the parties' child's education solely. 
8. The parties have obtained insurances during the course of the marriage. The petitioner will 
remain as the beneficiary on the Oldline life insurance policy which has a face value of approximately 
$100,000, policy number 5 1364551L, which is insuring the life of the respondent. 
The parties will be joint beneficiaries on the Oldline life insurance policy which has a face 
value of $40,000 policy number 5 1689739L which insures the petitioner. If the parties jointly decide 
to surrender the $40,000 policy they shall do the same pursuant to a written agreement and equally 
divide the surrender value of said policy. 
9. The home and real property that was acquired during the marriage by the parties and is 
more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 13, Lazy Bar No. 2 Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on file and 
of record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
is awarded to the petitioner free and clear of any claim by the respondent. The petitioner is to pay 
the first mortgage owing upon the real property and to hold the respondent harmless from the same. 
10. Each party shall be responsible for their own attorneys fees and costs incurred in this 
matter. 
11. Each party is awarded those items of personal property they presently hold in their 
possession free and clear of any claim by the other. 
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12. The petitioner is awarded the automobile in her possession together with the debt and 
obligation owing against the same. 
13. The respondent is awarded the truck presently in his possession free and clear of any 
claim by the petitioner. 
14. Each party is required to sign any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms and 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this ^ day oFMatch, 1998. 
BY THE COUR 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and DECREE OF DIVORCE, by placing 
the same in the United States Mail, in a postage prepaid sealed envelope, this ' 2 ^ 3 o a y of April, 
1998. 
JANE ALLEN 
310 SOUTH MAIN #1305 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
ALAN BRUCE SMITH 
225 SOUTH CAMPUS 
OREM, UTAH 84057 
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EXHIBIT B 
COPY 
t\ 
AFr. 3 0 2004 
^ . SALT LAtfE CCUNTY 
By s w Dcf.uiy CSork 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
CHRISTINE COREISSEN SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN BRUCE SMITH, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 97 490 0256 DA 
JUDGE L. A. DEVER 
This matter came before the Court on March 2, 2004, on Defendant's Petition 
to Modify. The parties were present and represented by Counsel. The Court heard 
testimony, received documentary evidence and heard argument of counsel. 
The law grants to the Court the authority to modify a divorce decree. The test 
is whether there has been a substantial material change in circumstances justifying 
such modification. Not only must there be a substantial change in circumstances, but 
it must be one not contemplated at the time of the divorce decree. 
When the parties divorced the plaintiffs income was $2154.00 a month and 
the defendant's income was $3546.00 a month. 
The evidence, at the hearing, established that the plaintiffs income has risen to 
$4192.00 a month, a 92% increase from the time of the divorce. Additionally, the 
evidence showed that her expenses had declined. The defendant's income since the 
divorce has risen to $3742.00 a month, an increase of approximately 5%. The 
difference in the increases is, by itself, sufficient to establish a substantial material 
change in circumstances. 
Was the substantial increase in the income of the plaintiff foreseen at the time 
of the divorce? A review of the Findings of Fact, the Decree and the transcript of the 
stipulation of the parties does not establish that future income from nursing was 
considered by the parties. 
Case law is clear on the issue of foreseeability. There must be some evidence 
in the record of consideration of the possible effect of the change or it will be viewed 
as unanticipated and therefore available for consideration as a change of 
circumstances. 
The Court finds that there has been an unanticipated change of circumstances 
and that the change has been substantial warranting a conclusion that alimony should 
be terminated. Alimony to the plaintiff is terminated effective March 2, 2004. 
Dated this 30m day of April, 2004. 
BY THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of April, 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order to be mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Randy S. Ludlow 
185 South State St, Ste 208 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Stephen J. Buhler 
3540 South 4000 West, Ste 245 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
EXHIBIT C 
CHRISTINE & ALAN SMITH 
COMPARISON OF NET INCOME 
2003 
ALAN SMITH 
Social Security 
Williams 
Gross 
Medicare 
Fed Income Tax 
State Income Tax 
Net annual income 
Net monthly 
$19,352.40 
$26,251.20 
$45,603.60 
$(704.40) 
$(1,371.42) withheld 
$1,170 .00 refund (2002) 
$(980.52) withheld 
$740.00 refund (2002) | 
$44,457.26 
$3,704.77 1 
CHRISTINE SMITH 
Monthly (based on $25.00/hr) 
Federal (based on 3 exemptions) 
State 
FICA & Medicare 
Net Monthly 
$4,333.00 
($391.00) 
($184.00) 
($335.00) 
$3,423.00 
